Determinants of collective action on the local commons: a model with evidence from Mexico
- 1 June 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 62 (1) , 181-208
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00080-8
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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