Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation
- 1 June 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 16 (2) , 309-324
- https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080307771
Abstract
Four experiments examined people's folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations--considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame--played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people's judgments as to whether or not that behavior should be considered "intentional." After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people's concept of intentional action.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: Beyond person–situation attributions.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000
- The Folk Concept of IntentionalityJournal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1997
- Which behaviors do people explain? A basic actor–observer asymmetry.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1997
- Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibilityPhilosophical Studies, 1996
- Intentional ActionNoûs, 1994
- Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Is a TheoryMind & Language, 1992
- Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional AttitudesThe Journal of Philosophy, 1981
- Functionalism, Psychology, and the Philosophy of MindPhilosophical Topics, 1981
- Neither Intentional nor Unintentional: [Analysis "Problem" no. 16]Analysis, 1978
- "In Intending" and Side EffectsThe Journal of Philosophy, 1970