The Presthus Debacle: Intraparty Politics and Bargaining Failure in Norway
- 1 March 1994
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 88 (1) , 112-127
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2944885
Abstract
Bargaining failure has been neglected in the study of interparty coalitions. I examine the unsuccessful attempt by three Norwegian nonsocialist parties to defeat a Labor party minority government in June 1987 when the majority opposition twice failed to agree on a simple vote to that end. This failure of coalition bargaining was facilitated by incomplete information, intraparty constraints and misdelegation of authority, and by anticipation of the impending parliamentary recess. Despite these complexities, simple noncooperative games like the war of attrition can shed considerable light on this and other unsuccessful negotiations. The “Presthus debacle” demonstrates that political parties bring many different objectives to the bargaining table and that the trade-offs between these objectives vary according to organizational and institutional conditions.Keywords
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- Competition ruins the good lifeEuropean Journal of Political Research, 1993
- Government Formation and Endogenous PartiesAmerican Political Science Review, 1993
- Perspectives on Positive Political EconomySouthern Economic Journal, 1992
- Games and Information: An Introduction to Games Theory.The Economic Journal, 1989
- Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative OutcomesAmerican Political Science Review, 1988
- Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. By Gregory M. Luebbert (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. xiv, 341p. $32.00).American Political Science Review, 1988
- Political Economy - Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe. Edited by Geoffrey Pridham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. xix, 308p. $44.50).American Political Science Review, 1987
- Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition TheoryLegislative Studies Quarterly, 1986
- Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918.Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 1976
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1975