Truth or consequences
- 1 March 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 71 (3) , 415-440
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00082-6
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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