Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking
Top Cited Papers
- 17 March 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Vol. 16 (1) , 103-124
- https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui042
Abstract
Students of politics have identified a variety of actors who appear to influence the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy, including Congress, the president, and interest groups. These lines of research, however, have often portrayed interest groups as actors with indirect influence (who, for example, work through or with Congress), rather than assessing the direct influence of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs. I conduct a test of direct interest group influence by analyzing an original data set composed of 1,444 interest group comments in reaction to forty federal agency rules. I find, contrary to the expectations of the extant literature, that the formal participation of interest groups during rulemaking can, and often does, alter the content of policy within the “fourth branch” of government. I conclude that those who voice their preferences during the notice and comment period rulemaking are often able to change government policy outputs to better match their preferences.Keywords
This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
- Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and Litigation in U.S. OSHA RulemakingBusiness and Politics, 2002
- Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural ReformPublic Administration Review, 1999
- Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the BureaucracyAmerican Political Science Review, 1998
- Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and Public AdministrationAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1998
- Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-MakingJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996
- Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory ProcessLaw & Society Review, 1996
- Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous WasteLaw and Contemporary Problems, 1994
- Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency RulesThe Journal of Politics, 1988
- An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic PoliticsAmerican Political Science Review, 1985
- Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The Politics of Energy.Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, 1984