Does information about competitors’ actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?
- 31 January 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 18 (1) , 39-57
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00033-8
Abstract
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