Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers
- 1 August 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 45 (2) , 239-258
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(98)00031-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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