Politics and Public Bureaucracies: A Reconsideration

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Abstract
In a recent paper an attempt was made to trace the impact of political pressures upon the structural arrangements of public bureaucracies. The existence of political pressures, it was hypothesized, would result in greater control of administrative activities and decisions through use of rules, procedures, formal systems of communication and a highly centralized form of personal supervision. The results of the study reported in the paper failed to support the hypothesis. It is tempting in the face of discrepant empirical observations to discard the theory as formulated. That has not been the procedure here, although in re-examining the original theory a number of unneccessary flaws were detected and (we hope) duly recitified, Discrepant observations however, may also be the product of deficiencies in research methods and it is wise to seek there for explanation. The postmortem represented here includes re-examination of the methods used. Let us begin, nevertheless, with the logic of the hypothesis. Is it flawed, or worthy of further consideration? The hypothesis emanated from a disturbing omission within the literature of organization theory. There is a lengthy programme of researche’s which has cumulatively added to what is now popularly referred to as ‘contingency theory’.

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