Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
Feminist argument against pornography is intelligible in liberal terms, as a rights-based argument of principle, and a goal-based consequentialist argument of policy. Ronald Dworkin prizes equality, arguing that a policy of racial segregation is wrong: it rests on inegalitarian external preferences. If so, women likewise have rights against pornography: a policy of permitting it rests on inegalitarian external preferences. Dworkin argues that a policy of racial affirmative action is permissible: there is a goal-based consequentialist argument, and it does not rely on inegalitarian external preferences. If so, a policy of restricting pornography is likewise permissible: there is a goal-based consequentialist argument in its favor, and it does not rely on inegalitarian external preferences.

This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: