Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
- 12 December 1991
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
In this chapter, the authors dwell upon the influence of the structure of asset ownership and of political lobbying for the nature of the public research budget on the rate and bias of technological change in agriculture.Keywords
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