Regulating externalities through testing
- 1 April 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 369-387
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(90)90067-r
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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