Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
- 1 August 2005
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 89 (8) , 1497-1517
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
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