Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- 1 January 1985
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 1 (4) , 295-306
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00649265
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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