Excessive continuation and dynamic agency costs of debt
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 46 (9) , 1623-1644
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00242-8
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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