Control as a motivation for underpricing: a comparison of dual and single-class IPOs
- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 69 (1) , 85-110
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00109-0
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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