Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 16 (2) , 155-174
- https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027300
Abstract
We argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets. Using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity, we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion, the persistence of labor market discrimination, market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimum wages.Keywords
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