Capacities, Universality, and Singularity
- 1 December 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 64 (4) , 605-626
- https://doi.org/10.1086/392574
Abstract
In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.Keywords
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