Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation

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  • 2 February 2007
Abstract
Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote evolution of cooperation in a fixed population size. With positively biased payoff structure, which is customarily used in evolutionary games, players with more neighbors play more frequently, earn more, and propagate cooperation to others. However, maintaining a social contact can be costly, and so the gross payoff per participation is not necessarily positive. We show that even a relatively small participation cost extinguishes the advantage of heterogeneous networks. In this situation, more connected players are charged more so that they are no longer spreaders of cooperation. If participation is even more costly, those with fewer contacts win and guide the evolution. Although the baseline payoff modulated by the participation cost is irrelevant in homogeneous networks, it drastically affect evolution on heterogeneous networks.

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