Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
- 1 March 2002
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 70 (2) , 693-715
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00300
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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