A Twist of Truth
- 1 September 1989
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 33 (3) , 500-529
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002789033003007
Abstract
This article considers the effects of arms races on the occurrence of wars. Existing evidence on the link between arms races and wars suggests that arms races do not necessarily cause wars, but that some arms races end in war and others do not. Why? This article proposes an answer to this question by examining the motivations of each racing nation to go to war by expressing those motivations in utility terms. Swings in military superiority between the racing powers provoked by the race create a motivation for war to exploit temporary advantages. Risk-acceptant actors are more likely to initiate arms race wars, and risk-averse actors are more likely to resist their threats. The conclusions of the argument are tested and supported robustly but not strongly.Keywords
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