Evaluating Coalition Theories: Some Indices
- 1 December 1978
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 22 (4) , 691-706
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277802200407
Abstract
Until recently the choice of methods to evaluate coalition theories has not been a serious problem because the vast majority of studies has been restricted to simple, three-person games. When larger groups are used to test various theories, a larger number of coalitions is possible and the coalitions may also vary in size; hence, it is difficult to compare and evaluate theories when group size is varied. Accordingly, some indices measuring the accuracy of theoretical predictions of coalition likelihood are proposed, compared, and evaluated. Indices to evaluate theoretical predictions of reward division among the coalition members are also compared, and some problems of data analysis are discussed.Keywords
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