Choices in Social Dilemmas
- 1 March 1986
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 30 (1) , 51-62
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002786030001004
Abstract
In a public-goods game, a variant of the social dilemma, 126 subjects made choices. In an attempt to better represent real-world communication possibilities, two conditions were created. In the subgroup communication condition, subjects were divided into subgroups. Discussion was allowed within but not between the subgroups. A control condition allowed no communication. Results showed that cooperation was significantly increased but not to the level at which the public good was absolutely reliably obtained, as had been obtained with full communication by Simmons (1980). Questionnaire data were interpreted as suggestive evidence that one's own choice may affect one's expectations about other people's choices, rather than vice versa.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods ProblemsAmerican Political Science Review, 1983
- Metamagical ThemasScientific American, 1983
- Social DilemmasAnnual Review of Psychology, 1980
- The effects of information in a resource management problem: A social trap analogHuman Ecology, 1978
- An experimental analysis of social trapsJournal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977
- Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977
- Postdecision dissonance at post time.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968