Virtues and perils of an empiricist approach to speech perception
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Acoustical Society of America (ASA) in The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America
- Vol. 105 (1) , 503-511
- https://doi.org/10.1121/1.424587
Abstract
Nearey’s “double-weak” approach [J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 102, 3241–3254 (1997)] advocates a pattern-recognition model in answer to fundamental problems of speech perception. Both theoretically and empirically, there is much to recommend double-weak. However, there is some question whether this approach avoids long-standing disagreement with respect to the objects of speech perception. In addition, the descriptive power of even relatively simple empiricist models such as Nearey’s can mislead with respect to fundamental articulatory and auditory processes underlying speech perception. Here, the positive contributions are celebrated, and several cautionary observations—germane to broader questions of experience and learning—are offered.Keywords
This publication has 45 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cross-language speech perception: Evidence for perceptual reorganization during the first year of lifePublished by Elsevier ,2004
- Effect of Voice Quality on Perceived Height of English VowelsPhonetica, 1997
- Effects of first formant onset frequency on [-voice] judgments result from auditory processes not specific to humansThe Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 1994
- Categorization of speech by infants: Support for speech-sound prototypes.Developmental Psychology, 1989
- Real Objects of Speech Perception: A Commentary on Diehl and KluenderEcological Psychology, 1989
- The Segregation of Items into Categories by Ten-Month-Old InfantsChild Development, 1985
- The motor theory of speech perception revisedCognition, 1985
- Influence of preceding liquid on stop-consonant perceptionPerception & Psychophysics, 1980
- Context theory of classification learning.Psychological Review, 1978
- Psychology as a Science of Objective RelationsPhilosophy of Science, 1937