Probabilistic values for games

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Abstract
Introduction The study of methods for measuring the “value” of playing a particular role in an n-person game is motivated by several considerations. One is to determine an equitable distribution of the wealth available to the players through their participation in the game. Another is to help an individual assess his prospects from participation in the game. When a method of valuation is used to determine equitable distributions, a natural defining property is “efficiency”: The sum of the individual values should equal the total payoff achieved through the cooperation of all the players. However, when the players of a game individually assess their positions in the game, there is no reason to suppose that these assessments (which may depend on subjective or private information) will be jointly efficient. This chapter presents an axiomatic development of values for games involving a fixed finite set of players. We primarily seek methods for evaluating the prospects of individual players, and our results center around the class of “probabilistic” values (defined in the next section). In the process of obtaining our results, we examine the role played by each of the Shapley axioms in restricting the set of value functions under consideration, and we trace in detail (with occasional excursions) the logical path leading to the Shapley value.

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