The locus of facilitation in the abstract selection task

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Abstract
Platt and Griggs (1993) reported substantial facilitation in a version of the abstract selection task in which subjects checked whether or not an explicit rule had been violated and gave reasons for their selections. This result provides an opportunity to test the domain-general view of mental model theory which predicts a specific locus for their result. In the present study, subjects were required to (a) envisage the counter-example to the rule; (b) identify the card or cards that could contain it, before; (c) selecting the card or cards they needed. As expected, the experiment showed substantial facilitation in the critical condition. According to the theory of mental models, enhanced performance should derive from the explicit mental representation of what is impossible (or impermissible) given the rule. This representation should lead individuals to identify the two cards and only those two cards that could reveal exceptions or violations to the rule. Consistent with the theory, more individuals required to check for violation of a rule identified both counter-examples correctly and selected them. The results support the notion that reasoning and decision-making depend on what is explicitly mentally represented. Performance variations can be explained in terms of the factors that lead to the fleshing-out of task-relevant contingencies.