Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance
- 1 August 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (3) , 1145-1185
- https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.1145
Abstract
We use a randomized evaluation of a Kenyan deworming program to estimate peer effects in technology adoption and to shed light on foreign aid donors' movement towards sustainable community provision of public goods. Deworming is a public good since much of its social benefit comes through reduced disease transmission. People were less likely to take deworming if their direct first-order or indirect second-order social contacts were exposed to deworming. Efforts to replace subsidies with sustainable worm control measures were ineffective: a drug cost-recovery program reduced take-up 80 percent; health education did not affect behavior, and a mobilization intervention failed. At least in this context, it appears unrealistic for a one-time intervention to generate sustainable voluntary local public goods provision.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- Job Search and ImpatienceJournal of Labor Economics, 2005
- Rethinking Social InsuranceAmerican Economic Review, 2005
- Severance payments in an economy with frictionsJournal of Monetary Economics, 2001
- Productivity gains from unemployment insuranceEuropean Economic Review, 2000
- Efficient Unemployment InsuranceJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Optimal Unemployment InsuranceJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- The Relationship Between Unemployment Spells and Reservation Wages as a Test of Search TheoryThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988
- Job Search by Employed and Unemployed YouthILR Review, 1987
- Unemployment insurance and reservation wagesJournal of Public Economics, 1984
- Unemployment Insurance and the Reservation Wage of the UnemployedThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1982