Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections
- 1 December 1972
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 66 (4) , 1234-1245
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1957176
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between the partisan division of the northern vote in U.S. House elections and the partisan division of northern House seats. From at least 1952 through 1964, there was a noticeable pro-Republican bias to northern districting, in the sense that the Republicans consistently won about ten per cent more of the seats than the Democrats could obtain from the same percentage of the vote. Following the 1964 election, this partisan inequity has disappeared, but the evidence suggests that this change is only temporary. The normal pattern of a Republican advantage in northern House elections is produced by a Republican gerrymander of accidental origins: the tendency of Democratic voters to cluster in heavily Democratic areas where their votes for Congress go “wasted.” Neither malapportionment nor deliberate partisan gerrymandering appears to have played a major role in distorting the outcomes of House elections.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional ElectionsPolity, 1971
- Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election ResultsPublic Opinion Quarterly, 1957
- The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election ResultsBritish Journal of Sociology, 1950