CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM
- 1 April 1997
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 35 (2) , 378-393
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01917.x
Abstract
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