Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State
- 3 March 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 46 (1) , 31-36
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050700045484
Abstract
Loan repudiations and property confiscations were common between medieval kings and individuals. Traditional accounts of these confiscations focus on factors affecting the kings, ignoring the motivations of the victims. This deficiency may be remedied by considering the problems faced on both sides of any agreement between a king and a group of citizens. A model is presented which explains the timing and the form of repudiations and confiscations without resorting to an assumption of irrationality by either party. It is general enough to address a persistent problem in the property rights view of government: How can an individual protect himself from abuses by his protector?Keywords
This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:
- A Theory of Self-Enforcing AgreementsThe Journal of Business, 1980