Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
Top Cited Papers
- 6 February 2004
- journal article
- review article
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 303 (5659) , 793-799
- https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1093411
Abstract
Darwinian dynamics based on mutation and selection form the core of mathematical models for adaptation and coevolution of biological populations. The evolutionary outcome is often not a fitness-maximizing equilibrium but can include oscillations and chaos. For studying frequency-dependent selection, game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms. Replicator and adaptive dynamics describe short- and long-term evolution in phenotype space and have found applications ranging from animal behavior and ecology to speciation, macroevolution, and human language. Evolutionary game theory is an essential component of a mathematical and computational approach to biology.Keywords
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