Contracts and asymmetric information in the theory of the firm
- 1 April 1988
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 9 (3) , 229-246
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(88)90035-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- The Economic Role of the Nonprofit FirmThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown CostsEconometrica, 1982
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1981
- The Role of Nonprofit EnterpriseThe Yale Law Journal, 1980
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent RelationshipThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1979
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976
- The Nature of the FirmEconomica, 1937