Board size and corporate performance: evidence from European countries
- 1 September 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 4 (3) , 291-304
- https://doi.org/10.1080/135184798337317
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of board size on corporate performance across a number of European economies. Agency models suggest that large boards may destroy corporate value. Our fixed effects econometric evidence demonstrates that the effect of board size on corporate performance is generally negative. A negative effect is isolated for all five European countries in question when performance is measured as return on equity; this inverse relationship is more difficult to isolate using market-based measures of performance.Keywords
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