Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection
- 1 June 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 217-224
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(93)90007-r
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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