Necessary and sufficient conditions for single-peakedness in public economic models
- 1 November 1984
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 161-179
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(84)90049-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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