Constitutional Compromises in Divided Societies

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Abstract
A considerable literature has grown up in the past decade or so on the problem of establishing stable liberal-democratic institutions in deeply divided societies, whether these divisions are religious, racial, ethnic or ideological in nature. A common finding has been that simple majoritarian systems (for example, the Westminster model) cannot work in such circumstances. The most obvious reason is that deep divisions in society reduce the likelihood that a party elected to power under a majoritarian system will ever be voted out of office as voting patterns that largely mirror communal or even strongly entrenched class divisions provide little scope for change through movement of opinion. Clearly, too, the ‘winner take all’ feature of majoritarian systems militates strongly against the peaceful alternation of power except in societies where a broad consensus exists on the legitimacy of political institutions. Such a consensus is least likely to exist in a deeply divided society. Further, without the prospect of power, there are few incentives for oppositions to adhere to democratic norms.

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