Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- 1 August 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 51 (2) , 233-254
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90017-e
Abstract
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