Executive stock option repricing, internal governance mechanisms, and management turnover
- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 69 (1) , 153-189
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00111-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- An examination of executive stock option repricingJournal of Financial Economics, 2001
- Altering the terms of executive stock optionsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- The `repricing’ of executive stock optionsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- On the optimality of resetting executive stock optionsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-For-Performance SensitivitySSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinantsJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Ownership structure and top executive turnoverPublished by Elsevier ,1998
- Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?Journal of Financial Economics, 1995
- CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical AnalysisThe Journal of Finance, 1993
- Sample Selection Bias as a Specification ErrorEconometrica, 1979