How do Young Firms Choose Among Different Modes of Investor Communications?
Preprint
- 1 January 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper analyzes how managers of young firms choose among various modes of investor communications, using data on analyst presentations, management earningsKeywords
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