Escaping the Fate of Sisyphus: Bargaining, Divorce, and Employment in the Patriarchal Family
- 1 March 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Review of Radical Political Economics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 1-19
- https://doi.org/10.1177/048661349602800101
Abstract
A radical bargaining approach, the Sisyphus Syndrome paradigm, is offered as an alternative to the neoclassical treatment of women's labor force participation and divorce incidence. In this paradigm, women who do not participate in the wage system remain in marriages because of the dearth of viable alternatives. The results from a simultaneous equation model, using data from first and second marriages, support the Sisyphus Syndrome paradigm, and offer a more realistic alternative to the traditional treatments of family behavior.Keywords
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