Agent heterogeneity and consensual decision making on the Federal Open Market Committee
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 88 (1-2) , 83-101
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00130411
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 29 references indexed in Scilit:
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