Outside and Inside Liquidity
Open Access
- 1 February 2011
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 126 (1) , 259-321
- https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjq007
Abstract
We propose an origination-and-contingent-distribution model of banking, in which liquidity demand by short-term investors (banks) can be met with cash reserves (inside liquidity) or sales of assets (outside liquidity) to long-term investors (hedge funds and pension funds). Outside liquidity is a more efficient source, but asymmetric information about asset quality can introduce a friction in the form of excessively early asset trading in anticipation of a liquidity shock, excessively high cash reserves, and too little origination of assets by banks. The model captures key elements of the financial crisis and yields novel policy prescriptions.Keywords
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