Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- 1 September 1995
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 24 (3) , 293-319
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243157
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- FIRST‐PRICE COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS: BIDDER BEHAVIOR AND THE “WINNER'S CURSE”Economic Inquiry, 1989
- A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory AnalysisThe Economic Journal, 1989
- Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory StudyEconometrica, 1987
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctionsEconomics Letters, 1986
- The Rate of Return Earned by Lessees under Cash Bonus Bidding for OCS Oil and Gas LeasesThe Energy Journal, 1983
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 1982
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 1981
- Dominance Solvable Voting SchemesEconometrica, 1979
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the LargeEconometrica, 1964
- COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERSThe Journal of Finance, 1961