Towards a Reassessment of Comte's ‘Méthode Positive‘
- 14 March 1971
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 38 (1) , 35-53
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288338
Abstract
In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities.Keywords
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