(Non)Complementary updating of belief in two hypotheses

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Abstract
Past research has led to the conclusion that two competing hypotheses are represented dependently, and confidence in them is updated in a complementary manner. It is argued here that confidence in two hypotheses can be represented either dependently or independently. Changes in confidence in the former case are always complementary, but changes in the latter case are complementary only under certain conditions. In three simulated medical diagnosis experiments, subjects learned about two illnesses in a manner expected to lead to either dependent or independent confidence. They were then presented with two symptoms sequentially (for each of several patients), updating confidence after each. Experiment 1 demonstrated that changes in confidence in the two illnesses were largely complementary for subjects with dependent, but not independent, confidence. Experiment 2 showed that encouraging consideration of the alternative led to more complementary changes for subjects with independent confidence. Experiment 3 succeeded in producing complementary changes from these subjects. Thus, complementarity does not imply dependent confidence, nor does independent confidence imply non-complementarity.

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