How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions
- 1 May 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 46 (4-5) , 829-845
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00218-5
Abstract
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This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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