Values, “Irrationality,” and Religiosity

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Abstract
The predictive validity of rational-emotive understandings of religiosity, values, and irrational beliefs was found to be limited. Two rational-emotive irrationalities, both of which were consistent with an adaptive intrinsic religious motivation, correlated negatively with a number of other irrationalities. Subjects from a religious college and those with a more intrinsic commitment were not uniformly more irrational than those from a state university and those who were indiscriminately antireligious. Indices of individualism and a relativistic hedonism, both of which are value systems recommended by rational-emotive theory, were not identified as clearly positive in their psychological influences. Overall, these data support previous suggestions that the personality effects of particular beliefs must be examined within the ideological surround in which they operate (Watson, Morris, & Hood, 1990).

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