Charges as Contested Signals
- 1 July 1989
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 9 (3) , 261-286
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00008461
Abstract
Government is about the supply and demand for many goods and services, but votes or social needs are the principal signal meant to give direction to public policy. Many neo-liberal economists contest this, arguing that charges or user-fees are more efficient for allocating services. Empirical analysis shows that in principle it would be possible to impose charges on three-quarters of the goods and services financed by government. Although some charges are imposed on a wide variety of public programmes, overall governments reject marketing what is marketable. Theoretical inconsistencies in government's use of charges indicate that they reflect political inertia. The conclusion offers an analytic paradigm for interpreting charges, since an accurate interpretation of the signals sent by charges depends upon attributes specific to a given public programme.Keywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- The use of knowledge in societyPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,2009
- Stars to Steer By: The Political Impact of Moral ValuesJournal of Public Policy, 1989
- Market and Non-Market Failures: Comparison and AssessmentJournal of Public Policy, 1987
- Maximizing Tax Revenue While Minimizing Political CostsJournal of Public Policy, 1985
- Keeping Kosher: The Epistemology of Tax ExpendituresJournal of Public Policy, 1985
- Bureaucrats and Budgeting Benefits: How do British Central Government Departments Measure Up?Journal of Public Policy, 1984
- State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975Published by Springer Nature ,1983
- Access to WelfarePublished by Springer Nature ,1983
- Policy Options for Charges and Means TestsPublished by Springer Nature ,1980
- An Introduction to the Economic Theory of PricingPublished by Springer Nature ,1980