Financial Distress as a Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper analyzes financial distress as a selection mechanism. We follow the process of financial distress from its onset to its resolution for a sample of 10Keywords
All Related Versions
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