Risk Management, Capital Structure and Lending at Banks
Preprint
- 1 October 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 28 (1)
- https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293378
Abstract
We test how active management of bank credit risk exposure through the loan sales market affects capital structure, lending, profits, and risk. We find that banks that rebalance their C&I loan portfolio exposures by both buying and selling loans - that is, banks that use the loan sales market for risk management purposes rather than to alter their holdings of loans - hold less capital than other banks; they also make more risky loans (loans to businesses) as a percentage of total assets than other banks. Holding size, leverage and lending activities constant, banks active in the loan sales market have lower risk and higher profits than other banks. We conclude that increasingly sophisticated risk management practices in banking are likely to improve the availability of bank credit but not to reduce bank risk.Keywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bank Borrowers and Loan Sales: New Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank LoansSSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
- BANK LOAN SALES: A NEW LOOK AT THE MOTIVATIONS FOR SECONDARY MARKET ACTIVITYJournal of Financial Research, 2000
- Interest-rate derivatives and bank lendingJournal of Banking & Finance, 2000
- The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market ValueSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding CompaniesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997
- The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit FunctionSSRN Electronic Journal, 1997
- Loan sales as a response to market-based capital constraintsJournal of Banking & Finance, 1995
- The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's BeenBrookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1995
- Securitization with recourse: An instrument that offers uninsured bank depositors sequential claimsJournal of Banking & Finance, 1987
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated MonitoringThe Review of Economic Studies, 1984