Closed-End Fund Discounts with Informed Ownership Differential
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
- Vol. 10 (2) , 171-205
- https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204368
Abstract
We develop a theoretical model to examine the closed-end fund discount. Our model identifies three causes for this phenomenon: (i) a self-fulfilling prophecy, (ii) a risk premium for the fund price risk, and (iii) a risk premium for informed ownership differential between the fund and its underlying assets. The model highlights the important role of asymmetric information between institutional and individual investors in explaining the discount and predicts a positive relationship between the discount and the quality of private information in the underlying assets. Using a sample of US equity closed-end funds, we test this prediction and find consistent evidence.Keywords
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